S5 Economics | Competition Policy Lesson Prep Guide | Anti-competitive Conduct, Mergers and Price Caps
- 2026-11-20
Students can recite maintain competition but cannot say why one firm holding seventy per cent of a market triggers a review, and they treat a price cap as the government pressing prices down without asking who absorbs the loss. This lesson reduces the topic to three measurable things: concentration, conduct, and the choice of regulatory tool.
01 Prerequisites (3-minute check)
If any of these fails, fix it before the lesson starts.
| Skill | Quick check | Pass mark |
|---|---|---|
| Market structure | Which measure separates monopoly from oligopoly | Number of firms and market concentration |
| Cost structure | Why average cost falls as output rises with a fixed cost | The fixed cost is spread over more units |
| Elasticity | What low price elasticity does to pricing power | The lower the elasticity, the more room to raise price |
02 Lesson flow (60 minutes)
| Time | Stage | Tutor does | Student does |
|---|---|---|---|
| 0-6 min | Concentration warm-up | Give shares 40/30/15/10 and ask who holds dominance | Compute the HHI and write one conclusion |
| 6-18 min | HHI arithmetic | Model squaring and summing, and say why squares are used | Recompute after a merger and compare |
| 18-30 min | Sorting conduct | Take the four categories and give an observable feature each | Classify four cases and cite the evidence |
| 30-42 min | Price cap | With fixed cost 90, marginal cost 1.5 and output 60, find average cost | State average cost 3.0 and the loss at a cap of 2.7 |
| 42-54 min | Regulatory trade-off | Compare a price cap with rate-of-return regulation | Write one side effect of each and a remedy |
| 54-60 min | Exit check | Ask whether a rising HHI always harms consumers | Name two things still needed before judging |
03 Teaching script (read it out)
Scene 1: Concentration is numbers first, adjectives later
The market is concentrated is not analysis. Write the shares, square them and add: 40, 30, 15, 10 and 5 give 1,600 plus 900 plus 225 plus 100 plus 25, which is 2,850. After a merger the shares are 70, 15, 10 and 5, giving 4,900 plus 225 plus 100 plus 25, which is 5,250.
Justify the squares: squaring weights large firms disproportionately, so with the same number of firms a more uneven size distribution gives a higher HHI. The effective number of firms is about 10,000 divided by the HHI, so 2,850 is around 3.5 firms and 5,250 leaves 1.9. Students see the change at once.
Shares, squares, then the effective number of firms
Scene 2: Four categories of conduct, one observable feature each
Collusion: simultaneous and similar price rises, bids that sit suspiciously close together. Abuse of dominance: predatory pricing, refusal to supply an essential facility, tying. Mergers: a large jump in the HHI with no likely entrant. Resale restrictions: minimum resale prices and territorial splits.
Each category needs a what you would look at, not a who said so. The commonest error is calling any price rise collusion, when simultaneous rises can follow a cost increase, so the test is evidence of contact and identical magnitude.
Every category must come with a feature visible in the data
Scene 3: Compute the cost of a cap, do not just list benefits
Model a regulated firm: fixed cost 90, marginal cost 1.5, output 60, so average cost is 1.5 plus 90 divided by 60, which is 3.0. A cap of 2.7 gives revenue of 162 against cost of 180, a loss of 18.
Then ask who bears it: a subsidy, meaning taxpayers, or under-investment and falling quality. Rate-of-return regulation does the opposite, allowing cost plus a margin, which invites cost inflation and over-investment. The question is never which tool is nice but where the problem is pushed.
Name who finally bears the cost of any regulation
04 Question types and worked steps
| Type | Example | Steps | Answer |
|---|---|---|---|
| HHI calculation | Shares 40/30/15/10, find the HHI and effective firms | Square and sum, then divide 10,000 by the HHI | HHI 2,850, about 3.5 effective firms |
| Merger review | Should the top two firms be allowed to merge | Compare HHI before and after, then check entry barriers and buyer power | 2,850 rises to 5,250, so conditions are needed if entry is hard |
| Classifying conduct | A supplier forbids retailers from selling below a set price | Match against the four observable features | A resale price restriction under distribution limits |
| Price cap | Fixed cost 90, marginal cost 1.5, output 60, cap 2.7 | Find average cost, then revenue against cost | Average cost 3.0, loss 18, so subsidy or lower quality |
05 Independent practice (3 questions)
| Question | Answer | What to watch |
|---|---|---|
| HHI in three steps | Shares 50/20/15/10/5, find the HHI and judge concentration | Check the squares are summed and 10,000 is divided by the result |
| Merger judgement | The top two firms merge, give two reasons for and two against | Check reasons rest on concentration, entry barriers and buyer power |
| Price cap | The cap is set 0.3 below average cost, give three possible responses | Check subsidy, lower investment and lower quality are named |
06 Common mistakes and what to say
| Mistake | Student writes | Say this |
|---|---|---|
| Calling any price rise collusion | Two fuel companies raised prices on the same day, so it is collusion | Give me evidence of contact or identical magnitude, a same-day rise alone proves nothing |
| Forgetting to square | Adding market shares and calling it concentration | The sum is always 100, only squares distinguish markets, so do it again |
| Only listing benefits | A price cap means consumers pay less, so it must be good | Revenue is 162 and cost is 180, so who pays the 18, answer that first |
| Confusing dominance with monopoly | A forty per cent share is a monopoly | Monopoly is about substitutes, dominance is about acting independently of rivals, keep them apart |
07 Homework (paper, section and question numbers)
- Economics chapter index — All chapters in this subject
- Full prep guide index — Matching chapters in other subjects
- Redo this chapter — Independent practice 1, 2 and 3: HHI, merger judgement, price cap
08 Exit check (last 5 minutes)
| Question | Answer | Decision |
|---|---|---|
| HHI | Squares then divide 10,000 | No effective firm count means redo the first section |
| Conduct | Four categories, one feature each | No observable feature counts as unclassified |
| Regulation | Who bears the cost | No subsidy or quality answer means repeat the third script |
09 Tutor FAQ
Must students memorise the HHI formula
No, but they must remember two moves: square and sum, then divide 10,000 by the result. Most exam questions test only those two steps.
Must every merger be blocked
No. Easy entry, strong buyer power or clear efficiency gains can justify approval with conditions. The answer needs conditions, not just a verdict.
Which is better, a price cap or rate-of-return regulation
Neither in general. A cap protects consumers but can starve investment; rate of return protects investment but invites cost inflation. The question asks for the trade-off.
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A TutorZone lesson-prep guide. Written by the TutorZone team; questions and lesson flow are original and are not taken from any school or publisher material.



