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S5 Economics | Competition Policy Lesson Prep Guide | Anti-competitive Conduct, Mergers and Price Caps

S5 Economics | Competition Policy Lesson Prep Guide | Anti-competitive Conduct, Mergers and Price Caps

  • 2026-11-20

Students can recite maintain competition but cannot say why one firm holding seventy per cent of a market triggers a review, and they treat a price cap as the government pressing prices down without asking who absorbs the loss. This lesson reduces the topic to three measurable things: concentration, conduct, and the choice of regulatory tool.

Objectives — Students can: (1) compute the HHI from four market shares and explain that a higher value means a more concentrated market; (2) sort anti-competitive conduct into collusion, abuse of dominance, mergers that lessen competition and resale price restrictions, giving one observable feature for each; (3) separate what a price cap and rate-of-return regulation each address, and work out profit or loss under a cap from fixed cost, marginal cost and output.

01 Prerequisites (3-minute check)

If any of these fails, fix it before the lesson starts.

Skill Quick check Pass mark
Market structure Which measure separates monopoly from oligopoly Number of firms and market concentration
Cost structure Why average cost falls as output rises with a fixed cost The fixed cost is spread over more units
Elasticity What low price elasticity does to pricing power The lower the elasticity, the more room to raise price

02 Lesson flow (60 minutes)

Time Stage Tutor does Student does
0-6 min Concentration warm-up Give shares 40/30/15/10 and ask who holds dominance Compute the HHI and write one conclusion
6-18 min HHI arithmetic Model squaring and summing, and say why squares are used Recompute after a merger and compare
18-30 min Sorting conduct Take the four categories and give an observable feature each Classify four cases and cite the evidence
30-42 min Price cap With fixed cost 90, marginal cost 1.5 and output 60, find average cost State average cost 3.0 and the loss at a cap of 2.7
42-54 min Regulatory trade-off Compare a price cap with rate-of-return regulation Write one side effect of each and a remedy
54-60 min Exit check Ask whether a rising HHI always harms consumers Name two things still needed before judging

03 Teaching script (read it out)

Scene 1: Concentration is numbers first, adjectives later

The market is concentrated is not analysis. Write the shares, square them and add: 40, 30, 15, 10 and 5 give 1,600 plus 900 plus 225 plus 100 plus 25, which is 2,850. After a merger the shares are 70, 15, 10 and 5, giving 4,900 plus 225 plus 100 plus 25, which is 5,250.

Justify the squares: squaring weights large firms disproportionately, so with the same number of firms a more uneven size distribution gives a higher HHI. The effective number of firms is about 10,000 divided by the HHI, so 2,850 is around 3.5 firms and 5,250 leaves 1.9. Students see the change at once.

Shares, squares, then the effective number of firms

Scene 2: Four categories of conduct, one observable feature each

Collusion: simultaneous and similar price rises, bids that sit suspiciously close together. Abuse of dominance: predatory pricing, refusal to supply an essential facility, tying. Mergers: a large jump in the HHI with no likely entrant. Resale restrictions: minimum resale prices and territorial splits.

Each category needs a what you would look at, not a who said so. The commonest error is calling any price rise collusion, when simultaneous rises can follow a cost increase, so the test is evidence of contact and identical magnitude.

Every category must come with a feature visible in the data

Scene 3: Compute the cost of a cap, do not just list benefits

Model a regulated firm: fixed cost 90, marginal cost 1.5, output 60, so average cost is 1.5 plus 90 divided by 60, which is 3.0. A cap of 2.7 gives revenue of 162 against cost of 180, a loss of 18.

Then ask who bears it: a subsidy, meaning taxpayers, or under-investment and falling quality. Rate-of-return regulation does the opposite, allowing cost plus a margin, which invites cost inflation and over-investment. The question is never which tool is nice but where the problem is pushed.

Name who finally bears the cost of any regulation

04 Question types and worked steps

Type Example Steps Answer
HHI calculation Shares 40/30/15/10, find the HHI and effective firms Square and sum, then divide 10,000 by the HHI HHI 2,850, about 3.5 effective firms
Merger review Should the top two firms be allowed to merge Compare HHI before and after, then check entry barriers and buyer power 2,850 rises to 5,250, so conditions are needed if entry is hard
Classifying conduct A supplier forbids retailers from selling below a set price Match against the four observable features A resale price restriction under distribution limits
Price cap Fixed cost 90, marginal cost 1.5, output 60, cap 2.7 Find average cost, then revenue against cost Average cost 3.0, loss 18, so subsidy or lower quality
Sanity check (teach this): Sanity checks: an HHI must sit between 0 and 10,000, anything outside means an arithmetic slip; market shares must sum to 100; before saying monopoly, state whether it is statutory, natural or conduct-based; a cap below average cost must produce a loss, so a profitable answer means fixed cost was forgotten; the deadweight loss triangle is the price gap times the output gap halved, and a negative answer means the direction is wrong; a merger verdict needs a stated remedy, refusing outright is not a full answer.

05 Independent practice (3 questions)

Question Answer What to watch
HHI in three steps Shares 50/20/15/10/5, find the HHI and judge concentration Check the squares are summed and 10,000 is divided by the result
Merger judgement The top two firms merge, give two reasons for and two against Check reasons rest on concentration, entry barriers and buyer power
Price cap The cap is set 0.3 below average cost, give three possible responses Check subsidy, lower investment and lower quality are named

06 Common mistakes and what to say

Mistake Student writes Say this
Calling any price rise collusion Two fuel companies raised prices on the same day, so it is collusion Give me evidence of contact or identical magnitude, a same-day rise alone proves nothing
Forgetting to square Adding market shares and calling it concentration The sum is always 100, only squares distinguish markets, so do it again
Only listing benefits A price cap means consumers pay less, so it must be good Revenue is 162 and cost is 180, so who pays the 18, answer that first
Confusing dominance with monopoly A forty per cent share is a monopoly Monopoly is about substitutes, dominance is about acting independently of rivals, keep them apart

07 Homework (paper, section and question numbers)

08 Exit check (last 5 minutes)

Question Answer Decision
HHI Squares then divide 10,000 No effective firm count means redo the first section
Conduct Four categories, one feature each No observable feature counts as unclassified
Regulation Who bears the cost No subsidy or quality answer means repeat the third script

09 Tutor FAQ

Must students memorise the HHI formula

No, but they must remember two moves: square and sum, then divide 10,000 by the result. Most exam questions test only those two steps.

Must every merger be blocked

No. Easy entry, strong buyer power or clear efficiency gains can justify approval with conditions. The answer needs conditions, not just a verdict.

Which is better, a price cap or rate-of-return regulation

Neither in general. A cap protects consumers but can starve investment; rate of return protects investment but invites cost inflation. The question asks for the trade-off.

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A TutorZone lesson-prep guide. Written by the TutorZone team; questions and lesson flow are original and are not taken from any school or publisher material.

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