S5 Economics | Oligopoly and Game Theory Lesson-Prep Guide (for tutors) | Prisoners Dilemma, Kinked Demand, HHI
- 2026-11-20
Students see “few firms” and stop thinking, then copy the monopoly diagram; in game theory they conclude that cooperating is best and ignore the temptation to cut price. This lesson narrows oligopoly to three checkable things: how rivals react, what each choice pays, and why the outcome settles on a cell nobody likes.
01 Prerequisites (3-minute check)
If any of these fails, fix it before the lesson starts.
| Skill | Quick check | Pass mark |
|---|---|---|
| Market structure | Distinguish perfect competition from monopoly by number of firms and price power | Many firms with no price power versus one firm with price power |
| Profit maximisation | A firm produces where MR = MC | The last unit adds as much revenue as it costs |
| Percentages | Shares of 40/30/20/10 add up to what? | 100%, so the four-firm ratio is 100% |
02 Lesson flow (60 minutes)
| Time | Stage | Tutor does | Student does |
|---|---|---|---|
| 0-6 min | Diagnose | Ask why two firms that agree not to cut price often end up cutting it | Write your prediction and your reason |
| 6-18 min | Payoff matrix | Draw a 2×2 table of (A, B) profits and ask “holding the rival fixed, would you switch?” | Circle the Nash cell yourself |
| 18-30 min | Prisoners dilemma | Contrast the cooperative cell (8, 8) with the equilibrium (3, 3) | Write one sentence: everyone rational, everyone worse off |
| 30-44 min | Kinked demand | Draw the steep and flat segments and mark the MR gap | Shade the range where MC can move |
| 44-54 min | Concentration | Compute HHI for 40/30/20/10 as 3000, then for 55/25/15/5 | Do the arithmetic and say which is more concentrated |
| 54-60 min | Exit check | One question: cooperation pays 8, undercutting 12 and 2, what is the equilibrium? | Both cut price, and name the temptation |
03 Teaching script (read it out)
Scene 1: Oligopoly is about rivals, not headcount
Students classify by number of firms, so “four firms” and “two firms” both label as oligopoly and analysis stops. The real feature is mutual dependence: every price and output decision requires a prediction about the rival response, which is why exam questions always supply information about what the rival does.
Carry one operational question through the lesson: “holding the rival fixed, would I gain by changing?” Every answer must name what changed and how the rival payoff moved. That question is the definition of a Nash equilibrium and the foundation for kinked demand later.
Every step asks: holding the rival fixed, would I gain?
Scene 2: Prisoners dilemma: rational firms, worse outcome
Payoffs: both hold price (8, 8); both cut (3, 3); A cuts while B holds (12, 2); A holds while B cuts (2, 12). Check each cell: if B holds, A earns 12 by cutting instead of 8; if B cuts, A earns 3 by cutting instead of 2. So A cuts whatever B does, and by symmetry B cuts. The equilibrium is (3, 3).
Students must state two things: first, at equilibrium neither can improve alone; second, (3, 3) is worse than (8, 8), so cooperation pays but is unstable because each side gains by cheating. That is where real-world price wars and tacit pricing enter the discussion, without commenting on named firms.
A Nash equilibrium is not the best outcome, only one nobody can improve alone
Scene 3: Kinked demand explains price rigidity
Above the current price rivals do not follow, so customers leave: demand is elastic and the segment is flat. Below the current price rivals match immediately, so few extra customers arrive: demand is inelastic and the segment is steep. Joined together the demand curve kinks, and the marginal revenue curve breaks into two parts with a vertical gap.
Conclusion: while MC moves inside the gap the price does not change – that is price rigidity. A student who draws a single straight demand curve cannot explain “costs rose but the price stayed”. Require the gap to be labelled and the sentence “MC moves inside the gap” to be written.
Rivals ignore a rise but match a cut, so MR breaks
04 Question types and worked steps
| Type | Example | Steps | Answer |
|---|---|---|---|
| Nash equilibrium | Given a 2×2 payoff matrix, find the equilibrium cell | Ask of every cell whether the player could gain alone | (cut, cut) paying (3, 3) |
| Dilemma comparison | Compare the equilibrium with the cooperative payoff | Write both pairs of numbers before comparing | 8 against 3, so cooperation is 5 better |
| Kinked demand | Costs rise but price is unchanged – explain | Draw the two segments and label the MR gap | MC is still inside the gap, so price holds |
| Concentration | Shares 40/30/20/10: compute HHI and interpret | Square each share, add, compare with 2500 | HHI 3000, highly concentrated |
05 Independent practice (3 questions)
| Question | Answer | What to watch |
|---|---|---|
| Payoff matrix | Fill three cells: both hold 8/8, one cuts 12/2, both cut 3/3, then find the equilibrium | Check that every cell is tested rather than assuming cooperation wins |
| Kinked demand | Draw kinked demand and MR, label the range where MC can move | Check for two different slopes and a vertical MR gap |
| HHI comparison | Which is more concentrated, 40/30/20/10 or 55/25/15/5? | Check the arithmetic 3000 against 3900 and the squared-share reasoning |
06 Common mistakes and what to say
| Mistake | Student writes | Say this |
|---|---|---|
| Counting firms | Stopping at “oligopoly means a few big firms” | The number matters less than the need to predict the rival response |
| Cooperation as equilibrium | Answering “both hold price because that is best” | If the rival holds, cutting pays 12, so the deal is unstable |
| Straight kinked demand | Drawing oligopoly demand as one straight line | Rivals react differently to a rise and a cut, so the slopes differ |
| HHI in decimals | Squaring 0.4 instead of 40 | Use whole percentages: 40 squared is 1600 |
07 Homework (paper, section and question numbers)
- Economics chapter index — All chapters in this subject
- Full lesson-prep index — Matching chapters in other subjects
- Redo this chapter — Reread with the teaching script open
08 Exit check (last 5 minutes)
| Question | Answer | Decision |
|---|---|---|
| Equilibrium definition | Nobody can improve alone | Answering “most popular choice” means reteach |
| Dilemma | Equilibrium below cooperation | Answering “cooperate because it is best” means redo |
| Kinked demand | Two slopes plus an MR gap | A straight line means redraw |
09 Tutor FAQ
Should more game theory be taught?
At S5 the Nash equilibrium and the prisoners dilemma are enough; repeated games and mixed strategies are extension material.
Must students memorise HHI thresholds?
No. Comparing two share structures with squared shares and explaining that uneven shares raise concentration covers typical questions.
Can we discuss specific Hong Kong industries?
Discuss structure and behaviour in general terms only, without judging named firms or their pricing, to keep the lesson neutral.
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A TutorZone lesson-prep guide. Written by the TutorZone team; questions and lesson flow are original and are not taken from any school or publisher material.



