A-Level History Past Papers & Drilling (Paper 2): Collective Security and Locarno

Question 1

(a) Three causal factors: institutional limits – League decisions needed unanimity and sanctions were enforced by members at will, so even the Assembly’s adoption of the report in February 1933 with about 95.5% support produced no action; great power priorities – Britain and France would not confront Japan over Manchuria and the USA was not a member, which made economic measures such as embargoes ineffective; and time and information – the commission was appointed in December 1931 and reported only in October 1932, while Japan controlled the region within the first five months. (10 marks)

(b) For the Depression being most important: unemployment soared, so governments put domestic recovery first – on the figures used here unemployment rose from 1.3 million in 1929 to 6.1 million in 1932 (up 369.2%) and the world trade index fell from 100 to 34 (down 66 points); the crisis eroded the money and politics of cooperation and states turned to tariffs and bilateral deals.

Alternative explanations: (1) institutional design – without enforcement powers or majority voting the League would have struggled even in better times; (2) revisionist powers – German, Italian and Japanese expansionism collided with the existing order, a structural factor; (3) weak guarantees – Britain, France and the USA never offered a credible collective security commitment and the disarmament conferences of the 1930s failed to fill the gap.

Comparative judgement: the Depression was a conditional factor that accelerated and magnified existing institutional weaknesses, while those weaknesses were structural; as “most important”, the Depression best explains the timing of failures between 1931 and 1936 but cannot explain why states still took risks, such as the limited sanctions against Italy. Conclusion: the Depression was the key catalyst; institutional weakness was the fundamental cause. (20 marks)

Question 2

(a) Three reasons: Germany accepted the western borders voluntarily, guaranteeing non-aggression with France and Belgium and agreeing to arbitration, which lowered the risk of conflict; great power relations eased, because French security concerns were partly answered and British guarantees helped both sides accept the terms; and the demonstration effect led to Germany joining the League in 1926 and to further disarmament talks, so diplomacy replaced confrontation. (10 marks)

(b) For a golden age: Locarno (1925), German entry to the League (1926), the Kellogg-Briand Pact (1928) and the Washington naval agreements all showed a willingness to settle disputes by negotiation, and the Dawes arrangements stabilised reparations and briefly steadied the European economy.

Alternative perspectives: (1) limited scope – only western borders were guaranteed, while Germany made no commitment on its eastern frontier with Poland, leaving a future flashpoint; (2) weak enforcement – the pledges rested on goodwill, the USA stayed out of the League and the USSR was excluded, so great power coordination was incomplete; (3) fragile domestic and economic foundations – the crash after 1929 exposed how shallow the basis for cooperation was.

Comparative judgement: 1920s cooperation was real but fragile: it changed how disputes were handled, replacing ultimatums with negotiation, but did not alter the power structure or build enforcement. Calling it a golden age is defensible only for diplomatic style, not for durable results. Conclusion: the atmosphere improved markedly but could not withstand the shocks of the 1930s. (20 marks)

Question 1

Increase = (6.1 – 1.3) / 1.3 x 100 = about 369.2%. A percentage change takes the original value as the denominator, and the essay should explain how this constrained governments’ room for action abroad.

Question 2

Fall = 100 – 34 = 66 points; relative fall = 66 / 100 x 100 = 66.0%. Points and percentages must be kept apart: the first is an absolute gap, the second a relative change (they coincide here only because the base is 100).