A-Level History Past Papers & Drilling (Paper 4): Weimar and Hitler’s Germany

Question 1

Line of argument: the Depression was the critical catalyst, but Weimar’s collapse also had constitutional and political roots, and the two reinforced each other.

The Depression: unemployment rose from about 1.3 million in 1929 to 6.1 million in 1932, which cost the centre parties support and boosted the extremes – the Nazi share reached 33.1% in November 1932, up from 18.3% in September 1930 – and economic collapse made Bruning’s austerity even more unpopular and pushed presidential cabinet government after 1930.

Other factors: (1) constitutional defects, since Article 48 emergency decrees and proportional representation made governments unstable and extremes easy to elect; (2) political culture and elite choices, because conservative elites in the army, landed interests and industry came to see Hitler as a tool they could control, so the appointment of 30 January 1933 was a choice by elites; (3) Nazi organisation and propaganda, which sustained mobilisation even while seats fell from 230 in July 1932 to 196 in November 1932.

Evaluation: without the Depression the Nazis would have struggled to break through in 1930-32; but without constitutional weakness and elite calculation the 43.9% won in March 1933 was still short of a majority, since 56.1% of votes went elsewhere and only with the DNVP’s 8.0% did the partners reach about 51.9%. The Nazis did not win a natural majority: they governed through coalition and emergency decree. So the Depression was necessary but not sufficient.

Conclusion: the Depression supplied the opportunity and the mass base, while institutional defects and elite choices converted them into power. (30 marks)

Question 2

Line of argument: the two worked together – terror destroyed organised opposition while voluntary support and economic recovery provided stability – and their relative weight varied by period and by social group.

Terror and coercion: the Enabling Act of 1933, the banning of parties, the emergency decrees after the Reichstag fire, the Gestapo and the camps, and the purge of the SA leadership in 1934 removed open opposition quickly, while the secret police and denunciation created a climate of self-surveillance.

Voluntary support: unemployment fell from 6.1 million in 1932 to 0.4 million in 1938 (a fall of about 93.4%) as public works and rearmament created jobs; propaganda, youth organisations and mass events gave many people pride and belonging; and foreign policy successes such as the remilitarisation of the Rhineland in 1936 raised the regime’s standing.

Criteria for judgement: (1) timing – terror and legal measures established control in 1933-34, and economic and diplomatic success broadened support after 1936; (2) group differences – workers and churches mostly acquiesced passively while middle-class and young people were more actively supportive; (3) function – terror explains why opposition could not organise, but the regime’s durability rested on economic and nationalist appeal.

Conclusion: a strict either/or does not hold; on “rested mainly on”, terror was the necessary condition for consolidation while voluntary support made stable government possible. (30 marks)

Question 1

Other parties = 100 – 43.9 = 56.1%; the two together = 43.9 + 8.0 = 51.9%. The figures show that the Nazis never won an outright majority and governed through coalition and emergency decree, key evidence when assessing who supported them.

Question 2

Fall = (6.1 – 0.4) / 6.1 x 100 = about 93.4%. One conclusion that cannot be drawn from the figure alone: that all Germans therefore supported the regime – part of the fall came from rearmament and from changes in how the statistics were compiled (for example excluding Jewish and female workers), and the figure says nothing about wages, job quality or forced labour.